As I understand it, the Ontological argument that is sometimes applied to the existence of God goes something like this:

God by definition is perfect. Non-existence would be an imperfection, therefore God exists.

However it seems to me there is something a bit off with the argument. For example, one could say,

I define a monster to be the scariest possible being. A monster would be scarier if it exists and is about to attack me. Therefore, I am about to be attacked by a terrifying monster.

Yet this version seems clearly false.

1. First of all, are these arguments actually equivalent or is there something fundamentally different between them that I missed?

2. Secondly, is this the same argument used by Christians or is there another variant? If it is/was used, who was it used by and how widely accepted is it? Do any major theological traditions raise any significant objections to this argument?

As I understand it, the ontological argument that is sometimes applied to the existence of God goes something like this:

God by definition is perfect. Non-existence would be an imperfection, therefore God exists.

However it seems to me there is something a bit off with the argument. For example, one could say,

I define a monster to be the scariest possible being. A monster would be scarier if it exists and is about to attack me. Therefore, I am about to be attacked by a terrifying monster.

Yet this version seems clearly false.

1. First of all, are these arguments actually equivalent or is there something fundamentally different between them that I missed?

2. Secondly, is this the same argument used by Christians or is there another variant? If it is/was used, who was it used by and how widely accepted is it? Do any major theological traditions raise any significant objections to this argument?

Is the following argument valid?

God by definition is perfect. Non-existence would be an imperfection, therefore God exists.

Something seems a bit off with the argument. For example, one could say,

I define a monster to be the scariest possible being. A monster would be scarier if it exists and is about to attack me. Therefore, I am about to be attacked by a terrifying monster.

This is clearly false. Is there something fundamentally different between these two arguemnts? If not, then why are they invalid?

As I understand it, the Ontological argument that is sometimes applied to the existence of God goes something like this:

God by definition is perfect. Non-existence would be an imperfection, therefore God exists.

However it seems to me there is something a bit off with the argument. For example, one could say,

I define a monster to be the scariest possible being. A monster would be scarier if it exists and is about to attack me. Therefore, I am about to be attacked by a terrifying monster.

Yet this version seems clearly false.

1. First of all, are these arguments actually equivalent or is there something fundamentally different between them that I missed?

2. Secondly, is this the same argument used by Christians or is there another variant? If it is/was used, who was it used by and how widely accepted is it? Do any major theological traditions raise any significant objections to this argument?

Is the following argument valid?

God is by definition is perfect. Non-existence would be an imperfection, therefore God exists.

Something seems a bit off with the argument. For example, one could say,

I define a monster to be the scariest possible being. A monster would be scarier if it exists and is about to attack me. Therefore, I am about to be attacked by a terrifying monster.

This is clearly false. Is there something fundamentally different between these two arguemnts? If not, then why are they invalid?

Is the following argument valid?

God by definition is perfect. Non-existence would be an imperfection, therefore God exists.

Something seems a bit off with the argument. For example, one could say,

I define a monster to be the scariest possible being. A monster would be scarier if it exists and is about to attack me. Therefore, I am about to be attacked by a terrifying monster.

This is clearly false. Is there something fundamentally different between these two arguemnts? If not, then why are they invalid?