The author below is of the Reformed Protestant school and referred to theodicy in this way:
"Shifting the focus from our own sin to God (ontology and metaphysics)
is one of the sources of dualism, ancient and modern. We must shift
the ground back to our covenantal transgression rather than
ontological fault. Romans chapters 1 to 3 show that in Adam we have
all become false witnesses – which is a form of evil, even if we are
unaware that we are false witnesses." Pilgrim Theology M Horton, pp
144-5 (Zondervan, 2011)
If God, in his foreknowledge, had been intimidated by the realisation that some of his creatures would abuse his good gifts and thus give rise to evil, then would that have prevented him from providing those good gifts? If so, then God would not be God, for the very possibility of evil would have stopped him! But because God is God, not even the vilest evil of any of his creatures will thwart his purpose to provide good gifts. God will overcome all evil, and the victory of the cross and the resurrection show that evil has already been judged; the execution of God's righteous judgment on evil is inevitable. Meanwhile, evil creatures do even more evil, but God has a timetable and he will be proven right by the end of it all. Evil is an attempted negation of God's good.
Epicurus was an Athenian philosopher who died in 270 B.C. and he raised the question of evil and God. He is attributed as the one who formed this question, called the problem of theodicy. Upon examination, however, it constitutes a double non-sequitur.
A – Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. That is not a sufficient basis for identifying God (or anyone else) as malevolent. He doesn't account for God having a higher purpose or reason to allow evil. He seems to presume that a benevolent God would swoop down and stop ALL evil, or render us unable to do anything bad. Thus Epicurus presumes God's function is to stop evil. But human beings don't know everything, thus our ability to judge whether or not the evil is justifiable is suspect. In the end, we can’t rule out that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing some evil to exist.
B – Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? That’s a different sort of non-sequitur. There is no obvious relationship between the first question and the second. That is: assuming that evil has an origin, there is no reason to believe that origin is different for each of these cases. Yet Epicurus fails to define what evil is. He needs to clarify that before he can say anything!
The answer is simple: God is both able and willing, but that has no relevance regarding the origin or the continuation of evil. God has, on occasions, demonstrated his ability to stamp on persistent evil but has always waited a long time first, to allow people to repent and to be spared his wrath. But guess what – people who hate God then accuse him of being unjust in stamping out persistent evil!
It is God’s will that all evil will, eventually, be removed from the cosmos, but in his way, at his time, to settle issues of good and evil once and for all. Evil was triumphed over at the cross, and by the empty tomb, but those who walk in darkness cannot see that. The issue has actually already been settled.
Theodicy fails to take on board what God has revealed of himself and his dealings with the evil that is displayed by both humans and demons. Theodicy picks and chooses from the Bible without taking it as a whole. It looks at the problem of evil purely from the human point of view, which is that of sinful, fallen humanity that is guilty of evil itself. As Horton points out:
"...there is now, because of sin, only the expectation of death and
judgment. [God's] law announces this to everyone who is under it,
whether in its written form or as it has been inscribed on the
conscience, "so that every mouth may be stopped, and the whole world
may be held accountable to God" (Ro 3:19).
Because of this original covenantal relation and revelation, there is,
as in Aldo Gargani's vivid expression, 'the nostalgia for God of every
living person.' And this nostalgia drives us to idolatry and
suppression of the truth - to a theology of glory that judges by
appearances, rather than to the arms of God through the revelation of
his Son... Thinking that their problem was merely shame rather than
guilt, Adam and Eve covered themselves with loincloths, and ever since
then we have found ourselves incapable of accepting - or rather,
unwilling to accept - the radical diagnosis of our own depravity. We
can talk about evil outside of us - the 'others', whoever they may be;
evil places, structures, forces, and principles. But, like the
religious leaders whom Jesus challenged, we refuse to locate evil
within ourselves (Mt 12:33-37; 15:10-20; 23:25-28)." (Ibid. pp146-7)
Those last 3 sentences sum up the problem of the Epicurean philosophy of theodicy.