Quoting the wikipedia article, "The claim that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds is the central argument in Leibniz's theodicy, or his attempt to solve the problem of evil." It is well known that this claim can be the subject of serious criticism. One example of that criticism is the last book by philosopher of religion William Rowe, Can God Be Free?, of which I link a review by Professor Timothy O'Connor.
Quoting the possibly minimum summary of Rowe's position from the Amazon page:
This book focuses on God's freedom and praiseworthiness in relation to his perfect goodness. Given his necessary perfections, if there is a best world for God to create he would have no choice other than to create it. For, as Leibniz tells us, 'to do less good than one could is to be lacking in wisdom or in goodness'. But if God could not do otherwise than create the best world, he created the world of necessity, not freely. And, if that is so, it may be argued that we have no reason to be thankful to God for creating us, since, as parts of the best possible world, God was simply unable to do anything other than create us―-he created us of necessity, not freely. Moreover, we are confronted with the difficulty of having to believe that this world, with its Holocaust, and innumerable other evils, is the best that an infinitely powerful, infinitely good being could do in creating a world. Neither of these conclusions, taken by itself, seems at all plausible. Yet each conclusion appears to follow from the conception of God now dominant in the great religions of the West.
William Rowe presents a detailed study of this important problem, both historically in the writings of Gottfried Leibniz, Samuel Clarke, Thomas Aquinas, and Jonathan Edwards, and in the contemporary philosophical literature devoted to the issue. Rowe argues that this problem is more serious than is commonly thought and may require some significant revision in contemporary thinking about the nature of God.
Now, it is clear that the issue raised by Rowe is solved fully and simply by Christian trinitarian doctrine, according to which:
A. God the Father indeed produced the best possible world that He could: the infinitely perfect divine "world" ad-intra of the Holy Trinity, though He did it not by creation but by eternal emanation or procession, and
B. God the Father eternally generates the Son and spirates with Him the Holy Spirit by necessity of nature (*), not by a libertarian free decision.
So, God the Father indeed cannot do otherwise than produce the best world, which is the divine "world" ad-intra, and He eternally does it by necessity of nature (*).
(*) as opposed to necessity from want or necessity from external imposition.
Question: Has any scholar already offered this answer to Rowe's issue?
Note that the question is fully objective. I am not asking for opinions on whether the answer is consistent with Christian doctrine or on whether it actually solves the issue raised by Rowe.