Short version
I'm specifically referring to Carlo Alvaro's paper The “Heaven Ab Initio” Argument from Evil. In it he argues against Christian conception of God:
Abstract
Logical and evidential arguments from evil are generally thought to have been rebutted by various refutations, defenses, and theodicies. While disparate, these responses employ similar strategies to show that Christian God has morally sufficient reasons to permit evil and suffering in the world, either to preserve human freedom, for the sake of the moral growth of human souls, or to train humans to be able to act freely without sinning once in heaven. In this paper, I defend the heaven ab initio argument from evil (HAIAFE), which demonstrates that Christian God could have accomplished all these goals, without the need for evil and suffering, by creating human beings directly as spiritual beings in a non-physical state of eternal bliss.
In short, Alvaro argues that there is a way for Christian God to create free-willed beings that can grow morally without ever experiencing evil. The option is for God to create free-willed beings directly in a spiritual form in a non-physical state of eternal bliss. In such a state, there are no objects of temptation, and by directly creating spiritual beings, God can eliminate carnal pleasure, which is the root of lust and evil and suffering. This, therefore, precisely demonstrates that “There is no morally sufficient reason for God to allow instances of evil” and, a fortiori, it shows that Christian God does not exist.
How do Christians rebut Carlo Alvaro's position?
Longer version
A few relevant quotes from the paper:
The Argument
HAIAFE (“Heaven Ab Initio” Argument from Evil):
- As a perfect being, Christian God’s goal is to create free-willed creatures that choose to love God and forever exist with him in a state of eternal bliss.
- An omnibenevolent Christian God would want to create free-willed beings in a state of eternal bliss devoid of evil if he could and if evil and suffering were unnecessary.
- An omnipotent Christian God can create free-willed beings directly in a spiritual state of eternal bliss devoid of evil.
- However, Christian God created physical creatures in a physical world that is full of unnecessary evil and suffering.
- Therefore, Christian God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good.
(A possible extended conclusion: 6. Therefore, there exists a deistic god that created the universe, but this god is not a person who willfully created the world or that has a relationship with humans. Hence, god cannot prevent or eliminate evil and suffering).
Clearly, the strength of the HAIAFE depends on the likelihood that the premises are true. Consider premise 1—God’s goal is to create free-willed creatures that choose to forever exist with God in a state of eternal bliss. While I acknowledge that not all theists agree upon God’s goal, this is what classical theism has been teaching all along. Why else would God create the universe? It seems evident that, in classical theism, God’s goal is to create free-willed creatures. Without free will, God’s creatures would be automata. Therefore, God creates and endows his creatures with free will and reason so that they can come to know and love their creator. Moreover, God gives his creatures the opportunity to choose to unite with their creator and live an eternal life of joy and delight in heaven or to reject God.
One might point out that one reason why God created humans is for his own pleasure. As, an example from the Bible, Colossians 1:16, states that “All things were created by him and for him.” However, being created for God’s pleasure does not mean that God created humanity as toys for his amusement. Rather, the idea is that God is a God of love and, as such, he desired to create other beings with whom he could have a loving and friendly relationship.
Therefore, according to classical theism, God made humans for their benefit. God endowed humans with the freedom of will so that they can acquire knowledge of the world and know God and build a loving relationship with God. However, God did not create human beings because he needs them. After all, the theistic God is believed to be a perfect being that needs nothing. It would seem wrong to say, for example, that God is incomplete without creation or that he felt loneliness, boredom, hunger, or fear. God loves humans but, presumably, considering that God is perfect, if we or the physical world had never existed, God would still be perfect and satisfied with his eternal existence.
The point of the foregoing analysis of God’s nature is that God’s goal for creating the world is to create creatures that are endowed with freedom of will and will benefit from knowing God and living in his presence. The important attribute is God’s omnibenevolence. This means that God is, so to speak, pure love, which means that his nature is devoid of evil. Since God is omnibenevolent, it follows that God created humans in his image as free, good, and loving creatures. As such, it is plausible to argue that an omnibenevolent God would want his creatures to have pleasant lives in the absence of violence, evil, pain, and suffering. Therefore, we have excellent reasons to accept premise 1.
Accepting premise 1 makes it easy to accept premise 2—God would want to create free-willed beings in a spiritual state of eternal bliss that is devoid of evil (moral and natural) if he could. Presumably, since God is wholly good, God’s nature is devoid of evil. It follows that God does not need or like evil; God would want to make sure that his children (or friends) would avoid all evil. Consequently, the best option for God is to create his children directly in a spiritual form in a state that will enable them to exercise their freedom without thereby causing and experiencing evil and suffering. Obviously, moral and natural evils are problems for embodied creatures that live in a physical realm with car accidents, death, violence, envy, tornadoes, earthquakes, disease, etc. However, these evils do not exist in heaven. Therefore, if God could, he would want to create his children in a non-physical realm as unembodied or spiritual beings in the first place. The only way for the theist to reject this argument is to show that it is impossible for God to create free-willed beings that can worship God directly in heaven. The theist, then, must demonstrate that in order to accomplish his goal, God is required to create physical beings in a world that contains horrendous evil and suffering, which is what I deny in the third premise. Therefore, this supports the truth of premise 2.
The question is whether premise 3—God can create free-willed beings directly in a spiritual state of eternal bliss devoid of evil—is true. I think that virtually all Christian theists would accept this premise, which is a direct inference from God’s omnipotence. It is often argued that God’s omnipotence should be viewed in the sense that God can do whatever is logically possible. For example, omnipotence does not mean that God can create another God. If “God” is defined as an eternal and uncreated being, it would be impossible for God to create an uncreated being. However, the fact that God cannot create an uncreated being does not undermine God’s omnipotence. Similarly, God cannot create a married bachelor or a square circle or a triangle with more or fewer than three sides. Nevertheless, it still follows that God is omnipotent. In short, omnipotence does not entail that God can bring about something self-contradictory. However, there is nothing intrinsically incoherent or impossible about God’s creating a non-physical realm inhabited by free-willed spirits that will directly experience God and freely choose to enter into a loving and friendly relationship with their father and creator. Consequently, if God is omnipotent (and heaven is not an impossible state of affairs) it follows that God can create spiritual beings directly in such a realm. Therefore, unless the theist can show that it is impossible for God to create free-willed beings directly in heaven, and that God must create humans in the physical world where humans experience evil and suffering before they go to heaven, it must be concluded that premise 3 is also true.
Premise 4 cannot be easily denied, God created a physical world, and the world is full of horrendous evil and suffering and natural evil. The conclusion then follows that God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good or, at any rate, not willing to avoid moral evil and human suffering. Therefore, God, as conceived by Christians, does not exist. Regarding the extended conclusion, the HAIAFE is consistent with the existence of a deistic god, a transcendent source or reality that does not create by willful action and is completely removed from the world. Such an entity, therefore, is not aware of humans and their suffering or joy. The important point here is that God can and would want to avoid all the unnecessary, horrendous evil and suffering that humans experience without jeopardizing his goal of bringing human beings to freely choose to unite with their creator. God can create spiritual, free-willed beings directly, in a non-physical realm that is devoid of evils and suffering.
Naturally, I now have to deal with the assertion that, if God exists, evil and suffering are unnecessary and avoidable. The fundamental question is whether God requires a physical world in order to accomplish his goal. As already mentioned, many theists observe that evil and suffering can be instrumentally good or that, at any rate, God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil and suffering. Furthermore, the theist might avail himself of two lines of argument, the first is the one already mentioned above in the quote by Hick according to which if God creates free spiritual beings directly in heaven, these beings would not be exposed to terrible, but important, character-building evils and, thereby, they would not be able to develop a deep moral character. Therefore, even if God can create spiritual beings in a non-physical state, he chooses to create physical beings in a physical world. The other is that God can create spiritual beings directly in heaven but doing so might run the risk that some of these beings will disobey or reject God.
Consider first the notion that the creation of physical beings in an evil-and-suffering-filled physical world leads humans to acquire richer and more valuable moral characters than what they would acquire if created ab initio in a world devoid of evil and suffering. Consider an argument that might support such a view. The theist could argue that evil and suffering are emotionally difficult to understand, but they are instrumentally good for people’s lives. The suffering and evils that we face in our lives generate wisdom, resilience, compassion, and thereby build a rich and moral character. Moreover, when we suffer, we are reminded of our fragility and finiteness.
That is why God chooses to create us as physical beings that experience suffering and evil existing in a physical world, because God knows that our experience of adversities is beneficial to us for our wisdom and moral characters. God could create spiritual beings directly in heaven where evil and suffering do not exist, but if God did so, such beings would miss out on the opportunity to learn compassion, resilience, and other moral qualities that suffering can generate. Consequently, God ought to create us the way that he did. Furthermore, as Aristotle suggests in the Metaphysics, and Socrates in Theaetetus, philosophy begins in wonder. However, if humans faced no suffering and adversities, they would not be able to create philosophy and science through which they acquire knowledge and truth. In short, good moral character and scientific and philosophical knowledge cannot be developed in a state of eternal naivete and bliss. Suffering teaches us to be compassionate and creative. Compassion is a deep awareness of the suffering of others with the wish to relieve suffering and promote well-being. So, in order to be compassionate, we must experience suffering.
Is all this true? Even if it is, why would compassion, resilience, and other virtues matter if God created us directly in heaven? After all, God is regarded as a wholly loving, eternal being that (presumably) never experienced pain and suffering. Therefore, if humans were created ab initio in heaven, perhaps they might never learn compassion from experiencing suffering, but what good is compassion if no one is suffering? The benefits we gain and the lessons we learn from suffering are understandable because we are physical beings that face problems inherent to our physical existence. Failing an exam, losing a loved one in a war, a broken heart, and more, can teach us to be strong, to persevere, to be resilient, and other such values. However, for spiritual beings that exist in a state of eternal bliss, those values would be useless. Furthermore, it does not seem to be true that spiritual beings created directly in heaven could not acquire knowledge and other moral qualities. Spiritual beings would have to learn a different set of virtues that are appropriate in the world they inhabit and useful for their particular nature.
The bottom line is this. Theism claims that, in the end, some human beings will unite with God and exist in a state of eternal bliss in heaven. Arguably, in heaven, human beings will not have jobs or cars or drugs or schools or weapons or any other earthly objects and practices. However, then, whichever moral lessons or practical skills that humans might learn from such objects and practices in the physical world, will be utterly irrelevant for them in heaven. According to theism, our final destination is our union with our creator in heaven. In Isaiah 65:16, the Bible says that in heaven, “…the past troubles will be forgotten and hidden from my eyes.” So, if the purpose of our existence is to unite with our creator and forever live in a state of eternal bliss where we do not recall our “past troubles,” then our past troubles, i.e., evil and suffering, are unnecessary and irrelevant in heaven. Consequently, God can and would want to create us directly in heaven.
Consider the analogy that, as much as they love their children, parents try to prepare them to deal with adversities and disappointment, both of which life is full of. Arguably, however, all parents wish that their children live joyful lives. Additionally, if it were possible, would we not all wish that our children lived in a world devoid of evils, violence, adversities, competition, and disappointments? Now, if God creates spiritual creatures directly in heaven, it does not mean that, necessarily, such beings would be a bunch of naïve souls. It seems plausible that they would have an eternity to learn what God knows and who he is. Therefore, I do not find the notion that suffering is character-building to be a viable justification for God’s creating us as physical beings in a physical world. Evil and suffering can teach us valuable lessons if and only if we are embodied beings, but such lessons would be unnecessary and irrelevant for unembodied beings. A car accident, the loss of a loved one, the Holocaust, slavery, child labor, war, and so on, might teach us something (whatever that might be) but what good are the lessons learned from such evils in heaven where, presumably, such events do not occur?
I now turn to the argument that God can create spiritual beings directly in heaven, but he does not do so because these beings might disobey and reject God. In the first place, it is necessary to consider the nature of sin. Theists typically regard sin as any human act that violates God’s moral law. For example, St. Augustine argues that evil is the privation of good as darkness is the privation of light. According to this view, sinners turn away from God’s goodness and, thereby, experience evil in a way that is analogous to our experience of darkness by moving away from light. However, what is evil? Augustine provides a helpful definition of it: evil is due to sin and sin stems from inordinate desire, which Augustine equates to lust (or “cupidity” in some translations) (1. 4. 9. 22).
As examples of sin, Augustine mentions sacrilege and adultery and argues that what makes such acts sinful is the fact that they stem from a person’s lust: “all evildoings are evil precisely because they come about from lust, that is, from a blameworthy desire.” (1. 4. 10. 34–35). Later, Augustine notes something very important, i.e., that good people are those who turn [T]heir love away from things that cannot be possessed without the risk of losing them. Evil people, on the other hand, try to remove hindrances so that they may securely attach themselves to these things to be enjoyed. The end result is that they lead a life full of crime and wickedness, a life which is better called death. (I. 4. 10. 32–36)
In the quote above, Augustine argues that evildoers attach themselves to carnal pleasures (earthly desires, such as wealth, success, food, sex, and other examples of carnal pleasure) and turn away from eternal, higher goods, such as virtue, truth, and God. It is cupidity, therefore, which is a lustful attachment to lower goods; furthermore, it is one’s desire for pleasure that leads people to sin. Thus, Augustine’s examples of sins are instances of lustful behaviors. He argues that sinners fear losing certain goods against their will. However, if we go by Augustine’s analysis of evil, what sorts of things can spiritual beings created directly in heaven lose against their wills in heaven?
As just observed, people can lose material things against their wills, things such as properties, money, a lover, and so on. They can have an inordinate desire for sex, food, success, power, and more. Note that these are not inherently bad things. Rather, it is a person’s lustful attachment to such things that causes evil. So, evildoing stems from an inordinate desire that places temporal objects above eternal ones. By eternal objects, Augustine includes wisdom, truth, virtue, the will itself, and, of course, above all, God. Now, the point that I am trying to make here is that it would seem possible for a being to sin or turn away from God if, and only if, that being has a physical body. As humans are embodied beings, they have a number of physical and psychological needs that they typically satisfy by eating, having sex, buying objects, and so on. So, it is possible for humans to attach themselves in a lustful way to material goods.
However, having considered that lower goods do not exist in heaven, then it would seem to be impossible that spiritual beings might turn away from God and attach themselves to lower goods because there are not any. For what could possibly cause them to do so? Because heaven is a state of eternal bliss, one is already completely satisfied. Since human beings have a physical body, and the body is imperfect and craves many things, it is understandable how some people become lustful and desire material things, things that produce carnal pleasures and turn one away from truth, wisdom, and God. However, a spiritual being, it would seem, would not become attached to material things because, by definition, there are no material goods in a spiritual reality. Additionally, if God creates his children directly in heaven, and the physical world never exists, then God’s children would not even have the knowledge or recollection of material things but would know only eternal goods.
Furthermore, consider the following example. According to classical theism, some people earn a place in heaven while others will (again, depending on the particular religion and interpretation thereof) either go to hell or will be temporarily or permanently separated from God or possibly brought out of existence. However, think about those who go to heaven whose loved ones are separated from God or destroyed. It would be difficult for them to remember their loved ones and at the same time live a joyful existence in heaven. However, if God creates spiritual beings directly in heaven, then such problems would never exist. If we were created directly in heaven, we would not experience the death of our loved ones.
What sort of spiritual objects could possibly be there in heaven that spiritual creatures could lose against their wills? Are we to believe that adultery, murder, theft, grave desecration, money, drugs, food and other cupidity-inducing acts and objects could exist in heaven? Presumably, spiritual beings do not require food or properties or money or drugs or jobs or sexual intercourse. So, what could possibly be the reason for sinning or turning away from God in heaven? Could souls inflict pain to other souls? Additionally, if yes, then over what? Is not heaven supposed to be an evil-free place? Therefore, if God creates his children directly in heaven, there is no reason to believe that God’s children would turn away from God because there is nothing in heaven that God’s children might desire. If by definition heaven is a state of eternal bliss, then nothing could be more desirable than existing in heaven.
The theist’s objection, however, is that if God creates his children directly in a spiritual world, then his children may freely disobey and reject God. Consequently, in order to make sure that the creatures that end up in heaven are only those who have learned not to sin and accept God, God creates a physical world where these creatures rehearse, so to speak, before going to heaven. However, what if God creates humans directly in heaven? Why could not humans learn not to sin in a non-physical world? In other words, this would suggest that the problem of disobeying and sinning might exist both in a physical and a non-physical world. However, then, assuming that it were possible for free-willed creatures created directly in heaven to disobey God, then creating human beings in the physical world first would not help. In fact, the physical world is detrimental for humans who endure pain and suffering and for God who watches his beloved children travail through evil and adversities.
Alvaro anticipates a few potential objections:
The Freedom Objection
A strong objection to God’s creating free creatures directly in heaven concerns freedom of choice. Namely, one might concede that God can create free-willed creatures directly in heaven and even that many of them might live happy lives in heaven. However, if God created his children directly in heaven, essentially, he would force them to accept such an eternal life without giving them a choice. The problem is that relationships do not work so well when people are compelled to be friends. Thus, the argument goes, God does not wish to force his creatures to accept the only option available, i.e., eternal life in heaven. Therefore, God creates a physical, pre-mortem world and invites people to believe and come to appreciate God, but at the same time allows people to freely reject God’s friendship.
This objection can be addressed fairly easily. In the first place, as things stand, our choices are already limited. Human beings do not choose to be born in the physical world where they experience horrendous evil and suffering. Moreover, the creation of a physical world where humans can freely decide whether to accept or reject God does not change the fact that, in the end, one must choose between an eternal, joyful existence in the company of God, or either a separation from God and a joyless and somber existence or the termination of his or her existence. However, the same choice is available to spiritual beings that are created directly in heaven. They can decide during their existence in heaven whether or not they want to continue to be there. In fact, God could even create his children in a pre-heaven reality where they can freely choose whether they wish to transition into heaven or to be obliterated.
The bottom line is that the physical world is not necessary in order to allow one to choose. Furthermore, by creating his children directly in heaven, God can better accomplish his goal of bringing his creatures to a friendly relationship with their creator than he would by creating them in a physical world first. Many of God’s children might resent God due to their experiences of evil and suffering. If created ab initio in heaven, there would be no atheists or scoffers or rebels. Everyone would know that God exists and exactly what he requires of us, thereby avoiding unnecessary religious wars and disagreements.
A variant of the freedom objection is that if God created us directly in heaven, then we would be deprived of lots of choices and goods that are available only to embodied beings. It is true that many evils exist in the world, the argument goes, but let us not forget all the goods—carnal pleasures. Therefore, if God created us directly in heaven, he would not only deprive us of carnal pleasures but also, more important, from our freedom to choose carnal pleasure.
My reply: This objection begs the question. It is only with hindsight that we appreciate the value of carnal pleasure. However, in point of fact, it is God that decides what reality is and what it is supposed to encompass. Thus, if created directly in heaven, it would be incorrect to say that God has deprived us of carnal pleasures. One would have to demonstrate that carnal pleasures are intrinsically good and so important that God ought to create us as embodied beings first; but I doubt that anyone could demonstrate such a conclusion. Furthermore, consider an analogy. Imagine two little fish born and raised in a fish tank. If they were able to think like us, and if life in the tank was the only reality they knew, they would not be able to complain about the fact that life in the ocean offers more freedom and options than their life in the tank, because they would not know what a life in the ocean would be like. Similarly, spiritual beings would only know a spiritual existence and have the freedom appropriate for such an existence.
The main goal that my argument attempts to accomplish is to demonstrate that a perfect God can and ought to create us directly in heaven. I concede that souls can undergo eternal moral growth in a way that is appropriate to the sort of environment they inhabit and in accordance with their nature. God can and would want to accomplish this goal without creating a world that includes horrendous evil and suffering.
The “Morally Good Reason” and the “Resurrection of the Body” Objections
Consider two possible objections. First, the theist can reply that even if the HAIAFE is valid, in the end, it is not possible to know God’s mind. Additionally, for all we know, it might turn out that God has morally good reasons for creating humans the way he did. Perhaps, when time comes and we meet him, God will explain to us why he did not create us directly in heaven.
However, how powerful is this objection? Not very, I submit. Theists must confront the HAIAFE head-on and put forth some convincing argument—“for all we know” is not one.
Concerning our resurrecting in heaven with a physical body, not all theists believe that this is true. Even if it is assumed that it is, it does not undermine the HAIAFE. Theists who argue that God will resurrect our physical bodies in heaven still agree that evil does not exist in heaven and that humans will be free of sin. This does not affect my argument because if heaven is a place inhabited by free-willed, physical beings that never sin, a place where evil does not exist, then God could have directly created just that world.
Theists, however, are left with bigger problems. If in heaven we get back our physical bodies, but evil and suffering do not exist (let alone hunger and other bodily functions), (a) what is the point of our having a physical body in heaven, (b) how can the physical body be unchanged and unscathed by external factors, (c) how can a physical body exist in a non-physical realm, and (d) if this is not metaphysically impossible, then God could just do that in the first place.
